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ABSTRACT

With the advancement of accelerated hardware in recent years, there has been a surge in the development and application of intelligent systems. Deep learning systems, in particular, have shown
exciting results in a wide range of tasks: classification, detection, and recognition. Despite these
remarkable achievements, there remains an active research area that aims to increase the robustness of those systems in critical domains. Deep learning algorithms have proven to be brittle
against adversarial attacks. That is, carefully crafted adversarial inputs can consistently trigger an
erroneous prediction from a network model. Hence the motivation of this dissertation, we study
prominent adversarial attacks to formulate an understanding of the blind spots in these classes of
algorithms. Then we leverage network interpretability methods to propose a computational model
that quantifiably measures the confidence score of deep neural networks (DNNs). This method,
codenamed network attribution confidence (NAC), computes the derivative of neuron activation
changes to assign scores to input features. This confidence metric enables us to develop a framework GAAD that serves as an attack detector. Based on these fundamental intuitions, we explore
the area of explainable artificial intelligence (XAI). Our research has enabled us to expand the
literature in the space by proposing a novel method for visually interpretable concept-based explanations (VICE). We motivated our findings by using various deep learning models and benchmark
datasets to achieve state-of-the-art accuracy.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

The application of deep neural networks (DNNs) has become ubiquitous. [69] shows its application
in biological research where a deep learning model was able to predict how genetic variation
alters cellular processes involved in pathogenesis. Other applications in [16] Natural Language
Processing (NLP) and [24] Computer Vision (CV) have yielded varying degrees of success across
a broad range of tasks. Therefore, utilizing these techniques to tackle problems while surpassing
human-level performance [31] is compelling.
While DNNs leverage large datasets to map obscure relationships, they remain susceptible to adversarial attacks. [63] discovered that DNNs, in their expressive nature, can learn complex mappings that may have counter-intuitive properties. One of those properties suggests that small perturbations applied to inputs to a network can achieve undesirable results - by reducing its accuracy.
Moreover, large networks trained on different datasets with near human-level accuracy demonstrated similar behavior against adversarial inputs. We determine that this finding is agnostic to
training algorithms or model architecture. In a favorable light, adversarial perturbations can reveal
gaps in network models that would have gone unnoticed otherwise.
This revelation motivated our research of different adversarial attacks and defenses to obtain meaningful insights into the esoteric input-output mappings of deep network models. Furthermore, we
investigate the juxtaposition of how two samples drawn from the same data distribution affects the
prediction rate of a DNN. In our discovery, we noted that while hyperparameters and convolutional layers may affect the model’s training accuracy, they do not indicate the robustness of the
network against bad examples.
More interestingly, the deepest convolutional layers of the DNN revealed that the network attributed different weight intensities to the same object under various attacks.
1

Figure 1.1: With a small amount of perturbation, a deep neural network misclassifies a dog for a
horse. The correct label (leftmost image) was predicted with a 33% confidence, whereas the wrong
classification (rightmost) with a 66% probability.

Fig. 1.1 depicts one of the most striking observations noted during our exploration. We trained
a deep learning model based on the ResNet-50 [30] architecture to perform a classification task.
It achieved 97% accuracy on the validation set. Yet, its prediction accuracy against adversarial
samples dropped to 10% with slight perturbation of the input image. While purportedly achieving
high accuracy, these findings suggest an underlying flaw in how the network maps a given input
to the predicted label. In other words, there is an inherent back-door that exposes a deep neural
network’s weakness. This flaw prompted our interest in evaluating the effectiveness of different
adversarial attacks against notable defense methods. The widespread use of deep neural networks
for mission-critical tasks further elevates concerns about the vulnerability of such models for realworld applications.

2

CHAPTER 2: BACKGROUND

The study of the robustness of artificial intelligent systems shows a lot of promise towards developing resilient models and can be trusted. Recent literature has shown a surge in the development of
AI-enabled virtual assistants and partners that can complement a human actor’s view of the world
in complex environments to facilitate decision-making. Hence the need for explanation in machine
learning decisions. Methods that exploit the compositional structure of opaque models to generate
insight represent a new area of research. Most recently, the European Union has put forth regulations [25] on the "right to explanation", these laws enable users to ask for a formal explanation
about algorithm decisions that impact them. The proliferation of such measures will drastically alter the AI landscape and the usability of models in a wide range of applications. This trend and its
potential impact drive our interest in exploring robustness and explainability in machine learning
algorithms.

Figure 2.1: Formulation of interpretability in machine learning decision.

3

CHAPTER 3: EXPLORING NEURAL NETWORK WEAKNESSES

Early attempts at defining the problem of vulnerability in neural networks remained mostly speculative due to the black-box nature of learning models. The mapping of an input x to a set of features
fi ∈ F in a multi-dimensional space was partially understood. When exposed to adversarial examples, the resilience of a classification model was a measure of its understanding between an
input unit xi and the extrapolated feature fi . Considering that adversarial samples are very similar
in structure to real inputs, discriminating between real and fake examples provided an intuitive
measure of a model’s predictive function. Noise attacks are a broad class of poisonous inputs that
are in some cases drawn from the same distribution as the training data with slight perturbation.
Although sophisticated methods [64, 28] exist to determine the perturbation factor in deep convolutional neural networks, the amount of noise applied to an image vector can be constrained by a
rudimentary approach such as peak signal-to-noise ratio, or [13] `2 distortion metric.
In many cases, these attacks are agnostic to a model’s training hyperparameters or network architecture. Furthermore, these attack methods are shown to be effective against image segmentation
networks, and chemistry models to demonstrate the security risks of deep learning models in a
wide range of tasks. A common reason for this problem is attributed to lack of training, quality
of data (significant noise), or inadequate regularization terms to limit the estimated coefficients β
towards zero. Efforts to discover the optimal linear function leads to limited success. By contrast, a linear combination of the inputs to produce an output such as a dense layer has shown to
limit adversarial perturbations’ effectiveness. Radial basis function (RBF) networks are a class
of artificial neural networks that feeds the inputs to non-linear RBF activation functions (hidden
layers) connected to a layer of scalar functions or output units. Fine-tuning the predictors of such
networks to improve their accuracy has garnered a significant amount of attention, normalizing
probability distribution from the output of the fully connected layers to produce raw predictions
4

provided a reliable predictive model [48]. However, the output of the final layer of the network
or softmax is not a sufficient measure of the interpretability of the network’s confidence nor the
learned visual features; this notion is shown in Fig. 1.1. There remains a pressing need to quantify
the confidence of a DNN w.r.t to its accuracy; this need is particularly relevant in high-assurance
systems. The detection of out-of-distribution input samples can lead to intrusion countermeasures
to prevent system failure or data compromise.

3.1

Attack Threat Model

An adversarial attack in the general sense is when an input x∗ given to a neural network subvert its
prediction accuracy. Suppose that x∗ is an image derived from x where x is a benign example that
the network has mapped to the correct label or output y. The value x∗ is slightly perturbed, which
causes the learning algorithm to misclassify the input. We define the learning algorithm that maps
x to y as F : X 7→ Y and the resulting x augmented with a delta vector as δX . Therefore, the output
produced by x∗ with respect to the algorithm’s mapping function is the erroneous prediction y∗.
Adversarial attacks to date are limited to specific objectives in specific domains.

3.2

Attack Objective

To understand the objective of an attack, we consider the nefarious intent of the attacker. Generally,
the goal of an attacker belongs in two categories: targeted and non-targeted. Supposed that a
classifier projects its input to 10 potential classes (Y) using the mapping function defined in the
prior section. We define (x,y) as the input to the network where x and y is a pair of feature vector
and label where y ∈ Y. With a non-targeted objective, the attacker merely aims to prompt a faulty
output from the network so that an adversarial input x* maps to a label t ∈ Y where x* does not
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belong to the label’s data distribution. In a targeted attack, the label t is specified by the attacker
so that the output generated by sample x* maps to the desired class.

3.3

Attack Domain

The domain refers to the attacker’s know-how of the victim network. This concept is analogous
to the terms internal versus external threats in the field of cybersecurity. An insider has working knowledge of the system’s operation, whereas an external hacker has a broad understanding
without explicit details. In adversarial attacks, we define the following:

• In the white-box domain, pertinent information of the attacked model such as parameters,
training weights, model architecture, data are all available to the attacker. As such, adversarial samples can be crafted based on insider knowledge.
• The black-box domain is limited to only what is publicly available about the model. For
instance, a proprietary model that tracks fraudulent credit card activities may hide all relevant
details about the network, including its input parameters. This approach requires feeding the
victim network random examples, while the output is monitored. Therefore, it is significantly
more challenging to succeed in this domain. Moreover, there may be physical or security
constraints that prevent the attacker from getting access to this model.
• A third one is gray-box, a scenario where the attacker has first-hand knowledge of the model
but cannot directly modify it. This insight lends itself to the development of an adversarial
network (i.e., generative adversarial model) using known parameters in a white-box setting.
Once trained, attacks using this network is performed in a black-box domain. This method
is relevant, especially for neural networks that are available in public repositories.

6

3.3.1

Defense Approach

In recent literature, several efficient methods are proposed to minimize attacks against machine
learning algorithms. [24] Introduced Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs), modeled after the
two-player minimax decision theory. In this approach, a generative network G and a discriminator
network D are trained in parallel. G’s primary goal is to fool the discriminator network with real
inputs sampled from the data distribution or fake ones that are instead carefully constructed by G.
D’s ultimate task is to discriminate whether the input from the generative network came from the
training data or not.

3.4

Adversarial Attacks

Our work covers four adversarial attacks: 1) Jacobian-based Saliency Map 2) Fast Gradient Sign
Method 3) Carlini and Wagner 4) Noise. We give a brief overview of each one below.

3.4.1

Jacobian-based Saliency Map

The method in [47] uses Jacobian-based Saliency Map Attack (JSMA) to fool DNNs. This approach comes in two flavors: a Non-Targeted JSMA (NT-JSMA) and a Maximal-JSMA (M-JSMA).
Since the majority of JSMA based attacks require a target class y, NT-JSMA offers significant performance because it does require a specific label. For example, it is significantly more difficult to
transform a zero (x) to a one (y∗) than it is to make the network misclassify x such that y 6= y∗.
M-JSMA further extends on NT-JSMA by removing the requirement to specify pixel intensity values. Rather M-JSMA stops when the predicted label for the input no longer matches the true class
label.
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Unlike the popular paradigm used by other methods that map output variation to input distortion,
JSMA generates adversarial samples by creating a direct relationship between perturbation and
output. The procedure for adversarial sample creation according to this method is devised as
follows: 1) forward derivative of the network is computed 2) the result of step 1 is used to construct
the adversarial saliency map which rates each pixel to determine their direct influence on allowing
the model to converge to a target class c = ŷ(x) = argmaxc0 f (x)(c0 ) - the function f(x) represents
the last layer of the model (softmax) that contains the probabilities for each class 3) the input is
altered by θ repeatedly until it produces the wrongful label. The forward derivative is effectively
the Jacobian matrix (as shown in equation 1), where ∇F(X) is the function learned by the machine
learning model.



∂ F(X) ∂ F(X)
,
∇F(X) =
∂x1
∂x2


(3.1)

A per-feature limit threshold defined by L∞ can be used to minimize the perceptual difference
between an original and generated adversarial input. The authors claimed that their approach
yielded a 97.10% misclassification rate while, on average distorting only 4.02% of input features.
In our experiment using NT-JSMA to generate adversarial examples, the distortion percentage of
input features gamma is set to 0.3.

3.4.2

Fast Gradient Sign Method

The attack described in [26] to our knowledge is the first of its kind. In their survey on linear
attacks of nonlinear network models, they derive the following equation to generate adversarial
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examples using Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM):

x + εsign(∇x J(θ , x, y))

(3.2)

where θ is the parameter of the model, x and y respectively are the input and the associated label; J
is the loss function to train the model. In our experiments, we noticed that FGSM is a fast adversarial generation technique relative to others; it computes the negative gradient at each iteration then
applies a pixel by pixel perturbation towards the direction of the targeted class. The fast singlestep method optimizes this technique on large datasets but converges to a global minimum, causing
gradient obfuscation. In the experimental section, we cover the side-effect of this short-coming.

3.4.3

Carlini & Wagner

[9] Addresses a specific class of defense techniques - Defense Distillation [46]. This defense
mechanism leverages knowledge extrapolated about the DNN to deter attacks by minimizing the
magnitude of the network’s gradients. Notoriously, adversaries capitalize on the gradient learned
by the model during training and apply them directly to the input to generate adversarial samples.
By reducing the magnitude, fooling the network becomes significantly more difficult. The result
of this approach in [46] shows that defense distillation reduces attack effectiveness to less than
0.5% while increasing the number of features that need modification to create counterexamples by
800%.
In their work, the authors of [9] found that this countermeasure aimed at hardening neural networks
by requiring only a single re-training step is susceptible to their novel attack with 100% probability.
Carlini and Wagner’s (CWL2) attacks are effective on both distilled and undistilled defenses. They
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proposed this alternate formulation of adversarial examples:

minimize D(x, x + δ ) + c ∗ f (x + δ )

(3.3)

s.t. x + δ ∈ [0, 1]n
where D(x, x + δ ) is a distance metric that determines the difference between the input x and
x + δ , δ is the amount of perturbation applied to x to create an adversarial image. f (x + δ ) is the
optimization function that constrains the perturbation.

3.4.4

Noise attack

The Noise attack is based on [5] that intends to overcome gradient-obfuscation as a form of defense. It takes a brute-force approach by perturbing random points to fool the network. As mentioned in section III.C, many defense method adopt gradient masking as an effective way to protect
a DNN. Recent literature, suggests taking a brute-force approach using random sampling to find
the learned gradient of the network.

3.5

Adversarial Defense

Here we explore methods for defending against adversarial perturbation.

3.5.1

Adversarial Training

The authors of [63, 71, 26, 42] demonstrated how this method enhances the robustness of a model
by injecting small poisonous samples in the training data to help the network reinforce its deci-
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sion boundaries. The training set is augmented with counterexamples and their accompanying
correct labels (x’,y) so that the learning algorithm will correctly classify those inputs. However,
the work of [67] showed that adversarial training remains susceptible to black-box attacks. In our
experiments, we leverage the existing work of [26], as demonstrated in equation 2, to generate the
adversarial samples used during training.

3.5.2

Defense-Gan

The work of [56] proposed an original approach to defense that scales to both white-box and
black-box attacks. They leverage the generative adversarial network (GAN) from [24, 3] to add a
sanitation layer in front of a DNN’s classifier that transforms x∗ to x. Wasserstein (WGAN) [3], an
extension of this work [24], makes the use of Wasserstein distance as a more efficient loss function
to the original GAN. We adopted the extended version for our evaluation.

Ex∼pdata [min||Gt (z) − x||2 ] 7→ 0
z

(3.4)

During training, the generator G learns to generate outputs that fall within the data distribution of a
benign input x in the form of G(z) where z is a random vector and the discriminator D discriminates
between actual and generated samples. As defined by Eq. (3.4), x is projected on G’s range to
minimize reconstruction loss at time step t. G and D are trained alternately. The reconstruction of
G given the input z is then fed to the classifier. This approach generalizes to any classifier as the
reconstruction layer is independent of underlying classification task.
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3.6

Explainability-based DNN Defense

The area of machine learning attack and defense has taken a cyclical turn. For every defense, there
is an efficient attack that can find weaknesses to craft harmful examples to implode the network
model. This paradigm has sparked a new way of thinking about security in neural networks. In our
experimentation, we leverage work in the field of explainable artificial intelligence. Unlike prior
approaches, we evaluate feature attributions. More precisely, we aim to understand the correlation
between the input features and the network’s predicted value. Consider the function F(x) where x
is the input to the network and xi is the feature at dimension i. We consider the sensitivity of the
ith feature on how it influences the prediction of the model, for example, in a classification task.
The axiomatic approach of [61] describes a method called Integrated Gradients which identifies
the relevant features that attribute a behavioral change to the input-output of a network.
Attribution method is an active area of research, notable contributions are found in [7, 59, 62].
Attribution is defined as following: suppose F : X 7→ Y models a DNN and an input x ∈ R, with
a baseline input x’ the attribution of x is obtained by AF (x, x0 ) 7→ a where ai corresponds to ith
dimension of a feature vector ∈ Rn . Studies in [61] proposed two primitive axioms that should
make up the building blocks for attribution methods.

3.6.1

Implementation Invariance

Given two networks A, B defined by f(x) and g(x) respectively. We say A and B are equivalent if
their outputs yield the same result for all inputs x. Such notion is independent of the implementation differences of the functions f and g, i.e. the former’s activation function is Sigmoid whereas
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the latter is ReLU. This is motivated by the chain-rule for gradients:

∂y ∂y ∂h
=
·
∂x ∂h ∂x

(3.5)

where x and y are the input-output of the function and h the implementation variance. The causal
effect assigned to the ith feature must be agnostic of h.

3.6.2

Sensitivity

Sensitivity is comprised of two distinct properties: functional dependence and independence.
Given an input x and a baseline input x0 (a zero-matrix) if they differ at a random feature i in
xi = (x1 , x2 , xn ) and produce dissimilar outputs, then the assigned attribution to feature i 6= 0. Inversely, if the network’s output is not affected by a feature, then the attribution of that feature must
be equal to zero.
Integrated gradients (IG) are part of a broader class of attributions referred to as path methods.
One of the primary advantages of the integrated gradients path method, unlike others, is that it
accumulates the gradients along a direct line from the baseline (x0 ) to the input (x). The path
integrated gradients (PG) is derived as follow [61]:

γ
PGi

::=

Z 1
∂ F(γ(α)) ∂ γi (α)
α

∂ γi (α)

∂γ

dα

(3.6)

In the equation above, γ(α) is defined as a path function for α ∈ [0, 1] such that γ(0) = x0 and
γ(1) = x where [0,1] 7→ Rn ; α is the interpolation constant along the path. One of the shortcomings
of using gradients to determine pixel attribution is that they model the highest local change in the
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direction of pixel values. As a neural network refines the relationship between the importance of
an individual pixel (a score) and the output label, local gradient values may saturate. Integrated
gradients accumulate local gradients to determine the overall score of a feature with respect to a
class label.
In our experiments, selecting a baseline (x’) image significantly influences the attribution. While
intuitively, a random vector i.e. 28x28x1 that models the dimension of the input can serve as a
baseline, choosing the wrong baseline has a several implications. As discussed in prior sections, a
carefully crafted adversarial example can fall within the same distribution as the baseline. As such,
the attribution AF would be an artifact of the baseline x’ rather than the input x. In image-related
tasks, a black image is used to avoid this problem. Moreover, x’ should be a near-zero matrix with
minimal noise so that the interpretability function of the DNN assigns credit to the critical pixels
in x instead of indiscernible signals in x’.

IGapprox
(x) ::= (xi − xi0 ) × Σm
k=1
i

∂ F(x0 + mk × (x − x0 )) 1
×
∂ xi
m

(3.7)

A practical approximation to the integrated gradients computation is shown in equation 7. The
new terms m denotes the steps in the Riemman approximation of the integral and k a variable that
calibrates feature perturbation. F represent the neural network’s prediction function,

∂ F()
∂ xi

are the

partial derivatives w.r.t feature xi .
In our analysis to defend neural networks against adversarial attacks, we extend on the work in [26]
which suggests a novel approach for fast generation of adversarial examples. This implementation
uses ground truth samples to produce an optimal max-norm constrained perturbation:

η = εsign(∇x J(θ , x, y))
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(3.8)

Figure 3.1: Using the ImageNet architecture, we extract the most relevant features to the inference
function of the model.

Here θ represent model parameters, with x being a set of input and y the labels for each xi . In the
equation above ε is the magnitude of the smallest encoded bit in an 8-bit image, and J is the cost
function. To subvert a network’s predictive ability, an image x is fed to equation 8, which in turns
produces noise that is applied on top of x. To mitigate the risk of adversarial attacks, we denote a*
as the attributions from Eq. (3.7) (depicted in Fig. 3.1) and A* as the dataset ∀a*. By synthesizing
the original input x, we only use the most relevant features that have a steep global influence on the
network’s prediction function. In our analysis, we adopted a gradient-based adversarial method an extension to equation 2 from [26]:

e , a∗ , y) = αJ(θ , a∗ , y)
J(θ
∗

(3.9)
∗

+ (1 − α)J(θ , a + εsign(∇ J(θ , a , y)))
a∗

As a result, raw pixel values of the image that do not affect the model’s prediction function are
discarded, and the derivative of the value function is further constrained as a∗ represent only the
attributions of a given input. The result of the adversarially trained network model is recorded the
experimental evaluation section.
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This approach has the following advantages: a) The range of adversarial perturbation is severely
limited even in a white-box attack as the model is trained on the attributions b) The classifier’s
decision boundary is further strengthened by assigning weights only to relevant features, and the
network performs its classification task with higher accuracy. This method achieves an error rate
of 0.0028% on adversarial examples.

3.7

Classification with Confidence

In this section we explore confidence in deep learning algorithms and the primary challenge in
developing trust-inducing models. Traditionally, the probabilities at the softmax layer was a sufficient mean to extract the predicted class, however [28] showed that those estimates are unreliable
in modern DNNs even in the absence of adversarial attacks; partly due to overestimation of the
likelihood of training distribution which yields biased predictions towards 0 or 1. This concern
is particularly critical in decision-making scenarios such as autonomous systems [41]. Hence, the
problem of lack of confidence in deep learning models can be attributed to poor calibration. Our
chief concern in this controlled analysis is the evaluation of a baseline network’s robustness in a
non-adversarial setting. Methods based on temperature scaling [48, 70] to minimize ambiguity regions between classes have shown promising results in rescaling the probabilities at the logit layer
to increase confidence.

3.7.1

Temperature Scaling

A derivative of Platt Scaling [50], temperature scaling is a post-processing step defined as scalar
parameter τ where τ ∈ R>0 . The desired calibration is achieved by selecting the optimal τ such
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Figure 3.2: Illustration of pre-trained model F0/ with temperature scaling. Here zi represents logit
(k)
vectors such that ŷi = argmaxk zi where k is the number of classes.

that the calibration error rate of a trained model F0/ (Y |X) is minimized:

L = −Σnk=1 log( f0/ (yi |xi ))

(3.10)

L is the negative log likelihood (NLL) [19] obtained from a validation set Zv . If f0/ recovers the
ground truth distribution D over X × Y, we say that L is minimized.

3.7.2

Calibration estimation

From [19] we can statistically formulate miscalibration as a the expected divergence between accuracy and confidence [28]. Accuracy can be estimated by grouping predictions in (N) internal
bins and determining accuracy for each N. The set of examples whose prediction confidence fall
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n
in interval I given by In = ( n−1
N ), N ] is denoted as Bn , therefore accuracy is defined as:

A(Bn ) =

1
∑ 1(ŷi = yi)
|Bn | i∈B
n

(3.11)

where the actual and predicted labels for i are represented by ŷi and yi respectively. We also define
the per bin confidence:

C(Bn ) =

1
∑ p̂i
|Bn | i∈B
n

(3.12)

the baseline network b(X) = (Ŷ , X̂) such that Ŷ is the set of prediction for a particular class and
p̂i ∈ P̂ are the associated confidences. We can derive an expected calibration error (ECE) [44]:

N

ECE =

|Bn |
| A(Bn ) − C(Bn ) |
n=1 c

∑

(3.13)

where c is the count for the instances in our set.

(k)

(k)

σsm (Zi )

=

exp(Zi )
( j)
∑Kj=1 exp(Zi

, p̂ = max σsm (zi )(k)
k

(3.14)

To obtain p̂ in the multicass classfication setting (Fig. 3.2), we make use of the extended softmax
σsm function (eq. 14) for K = 10 classes.
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CHAPTER 4: GAAD - GRADIENT-BASED ADVERSARIAL ATTACK
DETECTION

4.1

Challenges in Detecting Attacks

The body of literature [40, 65, 17, 52] aimed at developing robust attack detectors have shown
significant promise. However, the development of novel attack patterns manage to evade existing
methods.

Figure 4.1: Our contribution (red, green, blue layers) is comprised of a meta-feature extraction
based on prediction confidence and a detector network trained on salient features to spot adversarial
attacks. We perturbed input samples with the Fast Gradient Sign Method (ε = 0.0015) on CIFAR10. GAAD achieves 97% accuracy on limited training samples.

Moreover, existing attacks such as Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [36] and Carlini & Wagner (C&W) [9] routinely fool modern detectors as they apply regularization terms such as `2 to
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limit distortion [15, 5, 53] of a benign input sample. Hence, distinguishing between safe inputs
(real) and harmful examples (fake) remain a constant challenge. The proliferation of these attacks
have demonstrated their generalizability and transferability in speech recognition models [32], and
image segmentation networks [23] with universal adversarial perturbations(UAPs) [74].
In many cases the classifier is used as a detector, a one-shot approach where a low classification
accuracy indicates the presence of a perturbed input. While it yields a computational advantage,
we have found it fundamentally flawed. That is, the accuracy obtained from the softmax layer [55]
has been shown unreliable due to poor calibration of non-linear models and new targeted attacks
can influence a DNN to render high accuracy towards an incorrect classification label.
Metaphorically, convolution neural networks (CNNs) embody the human visual system, Hubel and
Wiesel’s findings in image processing provides a well established history in this problem space.
In CNNs, explaining the activation of a neuron to a visual stimuli presents a difficult problem
that challenges the security and application of these models in many fields. For instance, existing
methods to increase DNN robustness such as adversarial training has been shown [37] to have
adverse effect in robotic applications.
To address this Fig. 4.1, we instead follow the activations at each layer of the network to discriminate between the coarse and fine features that guides an input x to a particular class ŷ. Each feature
is scored according to their attributions, then we accumulate the relevance scores at all layers to
formulate a network attribution confidence (NAC) metric. With this computational model, we extrapolate the most relevant meta-features with respect to a class and train a detector on the latent
dimensions to determine whether an input falls within the neighborhood of the training sample or
not. We codename this gradient-based adversarial attack detection GAAD, an independent detector network that can serve as an additive layer to existing architectures or standalone. We show
that this technique is effective even on unseen attacks.
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To empirically support our findings, we evaluate the GAAD method on various computer vision
attacks by achieving state-of-the-art F1 and AUC-ROC scores, and compare our results against
existing methods. Furthermore, we show that this technique is considerably scalable by combining
our classier with the InceptionV3 [64] architecture and find that it only adds a minimal cost at
inference time. We summarize the main contributions below:

• A meta-feature extraction method that acts as a footprint for each classification label.
• A confidence metric, which computes the local gradient averages to determine input attributions as a factor of their influence on a classifier.
• A robust detector, which achieved significant results in detecting three benchmark adversarial attacks.

4.1.1

Problem Definition

In the quest towards protecting neural networks, two traditional paths have become preeminent: 1)
strengthening inference capability 2) detecting adversarial attack. Our survey of the former reveal
an inherent cost in increasing robustness as networks become deeper and more complex with regularization terms. In practice, it is a trade-off between security versus accuracy [68]. We investigate
the latter as it does not compromise accuracy nor increase complexity while possessing transferable properties - with fine-tuning could lead to attack detection under multiple threat models. We
define the classification task as follows:

f (x,W, b) = Wxi + b = Y
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(4.1)

where x is an input image. During training we optimize W and b that are the weights and biases
to produce the logit vector Y from which we estimate the probability of a class j with a function
S(y j ). Optimality is achieved by minimizing the cross-entropy loss of f (·):
L = −Σni=1 log( f (yi |xi ))

(4.2)

where L averages the loss over n training samples. An attacker’s goal is to produce a norm bounded
perturbation η that causes significant changes in the model output such that argmax j f (x + η) j 6=
argmax j f (x) j . Our hypothesis to detect an attack is to minimize the perturbation region around
the input x so that an infinitesimal amount of change ||η|| ≤ δ applied to generate x0 = x + η
maximizes the divergence in the input distribution between x and x0 . To do so, we aim to map the
gradient of the input space to subsample Rk 7→ Rd to obtain meta-feature ∆x:

S i, j = (∆xi , y j ), i = 1, 2, 3, ..., N, j = 1, 2, 3..., K,

(4.3)

here, S i, j is the ith meta sample for the label j. We say that the optimal distribution pb =
Sbenign , pa = Sadv is valid, if {x|pb (x) = pa (x)} has a Lebesgue distance that is greater than zero.
In this paper, we proposed a method to optimize S.

4.1.2

Notable Detection Methods

We provide a brief overview of notable methods that explores detection of adversarial attacks:
local Intrinsic Dimensionality (LID) [40] , NeuralFingerprinting (NFP) [17], defense perturbation
via image transform (ImageT) [65] , and detection from artifacts (Artifacts) [18].

• LID: follows the local intrinsic dimension of the input to obtain a maximum likelihood
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estimation (MLE) of a reference sample x in a data distribution P. The MLE estimator is
applied to k-nearest neighborhood from the points in P for a valid k.
• NFP: generates a set of fingerprints sampled from the data-distribution during training. The
encoded prints characterizes the model’s sensitivity to predefined perturbations. NFP maximizes the softmax output score during training to separate real and fake samples. Detection
is performed by D(x0 , f , X i, j ) ≤ τ where the objective function D above the threshold τ
indicates adversarial attack.
• ImageT: Which applies several transformations to the input such as translation, scale, contrast, bit depth, gaussian noise. Each transformation is thresholded by several parameters so
that the range of the interpolated image falls in the distribution of the unmodified input. The
output of the transformation becomes the input to a set of classifiers. A voting strategy is
then employed to classify attacks.
• Artifacts: uses Kernel Density (k) estimation to determine whether x falls within the submanifold of a predicted class, fˆ(x) =

1
|Xt | ∑xi ∈Xt

k(xi , x). This method is combined with

Bayesian uncertainty to compose a unified classifier that detects perturbed inputs in DNNs.

4.1.3

Limitations

Careful review of these methods show several limitations. The predefined set generation proposed
in [17] during training requires internal knowledge and augmentation of the network. While the
theoretical approach to separate the decision boundary hyperplane in the linear case (SVM) is
promising, in practice however choosing the fingerprints in non-linear models proved challenging.
[18] generate T samples from the network’s distribution (using i.i.d) to produce a Monte Carlo
variance estimate, we find a strong dependence on the specific network structure (including hidden layers, dropout rate) and choosing the adequate T can be difficult. The arbitrary thresholding
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parameters for input variation in [65] proved to be costly and the ensemble approach based on
Kullback divergence has limited scalability. Minibatch sampling in [40] in practice can be a bottleneck as the input distribution P grows but P must be large enough to estimate the neighborhood
of x. Additionally, [26] demonstrates that regularization strategies such as dropout do not yield
significant results in improving non-linear models.We address these shortcomings with GAAD, a
simple yet robust detector.

4.2

The GAAD Method

4.2.1

Overview

We present our adversarial attack detection method using a two-shot approach. That is, the detector
is independent of the classifier. First we approximate the activations of the model to find the
relevant pixels in a 2D or 3D image. Then we quantifiably estimate how each dimension of the
input influences the model based on feature attributions. Then construct a metric which guides our
analysis in subsampling latent variables in the image spectrum. Finally, our detector is trained on
the fine-grained submanifold to efficiently detects attacks. A significant advantage of this approach
is that the detector is a lightweight CNN which can be an additional layer to an existing model
without retraining the base network or a standalone detection network. This flexibility lends itself
to greater adaptability of our approach for practical purposes. A depiction is shown in Fig. 4.2.
The motivation behind this framework stems from the fact that attacks have been the achilles’ heel
of DNNs for safety critical applications. We aimed to achieve the following goals:

• Validity: ability to assign a probable cause to an input that justifies its belonging to a particular class.
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Figure 4.2: Overview of the GAAD method. We start by generating salient features towards a
specific labels. Then, we accumulate the top meta-features for each class and train our detector to
discriminate between benign and adversarial subsamples.

• Integrity: ability of the model to interpret its causal attribution as a function of the task rather
than the prediction from the softmax layer.

4.2.2

Generating Meta-features

We formalize a traditional convolutional neural network as F(·) : Rd 7→ RY where Y is a set of
classification labels and a given input F(x) belongs to Rd . Commonly, the softmax function
σ (z)i = exp(zi )/ ∑Yj=1 exp(zi ) represent the final layer from which we obtain the normalized logprobability for a given label ŷ = arg maxi∈[Y ] F(x)i . While σ purportedly estimate the ground truth
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probabilities that an input belongs to a class, it is shown to be remarkably unreliable due to poor
calibration [35, 28]. For this reason we define F(X) 7→ Z where z ∈ Z is a vector representing the
transformation applied to x at a given layer L. We define L = ∑(Ws ∗ Z) + bs where W is the weight
coefficients and b the biases.
In ReLU networks, the prediction function at the input may flatten, which breaks the sensitivity axiom of attribution methods. However, we follow the activations that approximates the coefficients
- by first choosing a baseline-input we denote as xb . In visual models, xb is a zero-vector in the
shape of the input x that credits the absence of a feature fi in x with a zero gradient.
We share fundamental intuition of Shapley value to determine the cost of each feature towards ŷ.
We denote the gradient

∂i F(·)
∂xi

where the path integral along ∂i F(·) gives us the attributions of x.

Fi∗ (x) = (xi − xib ) ×

Z 1
∂ F(xb + α × (x − xb ))

∂ xi

α

× dα

(4.4)

We say that Fi∗ (x) outputs a causal matrix with latent dimensions of the input. Hereafter, F ∗ (X) 7→
T represents a set of meta-features such that T = {t1 ,t2 ,t3 , ...,tn }. Visualization of intermediate
layer activations, further develops the intuition in analyzing this from a causal perspective. Our
observation follows the reasoning that perturbation applied at random dimensions of the input
maximizes the distance between x and xadv . While successful image segmentation techniques
such as [73] show noise applied along the dimension that maximizes the activation produces a
significantly smaller ||η|| where xadv = x + η, our attack detector D learns to draw the boundary
between the distributions of Fi∗ (x) and Fi∗ (xa dv)) samples.
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4.2.3

Confident Subsampling of Meta-features

We let f1 and f2 denote two non-linear models, we say that they are functionally equivalent if they
project onto the same classification manifold such that f1 7→ Y and f2 7→ Y , regardless of their
implementation. Therefore, a confidence C( f (·)) is invariant of both f1 and f2 . The work in [28,
15, 45] provide learning-theoretic insights on the challenge in computing a confidence score.
With the parametric function defined at Fi∗ (x), an input sample conforms to a distribution if the
output of zi can be projected in the manifold of the input w.r.t a label ŷ. We hypothesize the
transformations through L yield non-linear points sampled from the original input space such that
T ⊆ X. Mathematically, we perform d(p, q) = |p − q| on any two points then use a binary matrix
y p,q ∈ {0, 1} to determine whether the labels match. We formally define a network attribution
confidence (NAC) subsample as:

C(~xt −~yt ) =

q
(Fi∗ (~xt )T S−1 F1∗ (~yt )

(4.5)

where ~x and ~y are two discrete feature vectors. A high covariance matrix (S−1 ) between the metafeature vectors given by Mahalanobis, reduces the distance from ~x to ~y, which implies they belong
in the same distribution space hence our confidence score. For practical application, both vectors
are constrained by the following norm zi =

xi −min(x)
max(x)−min(x)

to achieve z 7→ [0, 1]. We then obtain the

subsample:

ST (x) = {C(x, F ∗ ) | F ∗ ⊆ T }

(4.6)

This k-nearest neighbor approach allow us to approximate the classification label while excluding
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weak training points from the input space.

4.2.4

GAAD Distribution Space

From S ∈ IRd , we further reduce non-linear dimensions with t-Distributed Stochastic Neighbor
Embedding (t-SNE) which promises that the distance between two random points pi, j and qi, j is
minimized in the distribution. We define the training space of detector D as follow:


exp −||xi − x j ||2 /2σi2

m j|i =
∑k6=i exp −||xi − xk ||2 /2σi2

(4.7)

where m j|i is a set of conditional probability and the embedding space as:

ni j =

1 + ||ei − e j ||2

−1
(4.8)

−1

∑k6=l (1 + ||ek − el ||2 )

By applying Kullback-Leibler divergence, we obtain a similarity cost such that C = KL(M||N).
We optimize the cost via gradient descent with a norm constant Z:

∂C
=4
∂ ei

∑ mi j ni j Z
j6=i

ei − e j − ∑ n2i j Z ei − e j


!


(4.9)

j6=i

The generated embeddings (eq. 9) help maintain the local dimensions between the meta-features
S and the generated embeddings.
D is a shallow CNN that classifies adversarial and benign inputs in the embeddings space. The reduction in dimensionality of dense meta-features significantly improve prediction cost at inference
time. For real-time application, the embeddings can be pre-computed as they are sampled from the
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training submanifold which enables portability to other image tasks.

29

CHAPTER 5: VICE - VISUALLY INTERPRETABLE CONCEPT-BASED
EXPLANATIONS

5.1

Introduction

Deep neural networks (DNNs) have become ubiquitous in recent years; their applications span
across areas such as healthcare, financial and autonomous systems. However, incertitude exists
in trusting such networks for critical decisions because their operations are commonly black-box.
That is, mapping the high-level dimensions of the input space to the low-level features that influence their internal state. The body of research that focuses on explaining such mappings has
made significant strides to enable transparency in DNNs using techniques such as saliency maps,
counterfactual examples, and prototypes. While these explainability methods help domain experts
troubleshoot and develop models, they remain esoteric. To facilitate the widespread adoption of
intelligent systems, it is imperative to provide interpretable explanations that resonate with humans
to evaluate the faithfulness and fidelity of DNNs.
From the literature in XAI [22, 8] we refer to explainability as the deductive reasoning step that
provides the ability to trace the computation from an input to an output which answers the how.
Whereas interpretability abductively starts with a partial observation that leads to the most probable
explanation in terms of why thereby rendering a system’s behavior intuitive. Systematic approaches
to understanding the former and the latter [27, 66, 10, 4, 51, 22, 38] have been analyzed on different
architectures of varying depth such as AlexNet [34], ResNet [30], InceptionV3 [64], and VGG-16
[60]. They show great promise. Generally, they fall into the following categories:

1. Class activation maps (CAM) [75] that identify sensitive regions by subsampling input vectors (feature-based)
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Figure 5.1: We show the relatedness of a concept to input and, using our concept completeness
score (CCS) quantify its saliency. In the second row, we see: a) the fuselage and area near the
engine nozzle, b) the texture of fur c) the tire are essential concepts to identify a fighter jet, brown
bear, and golf cart. In row three, we show their covariance towards each class with the VICE
framework.
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2. Conception activation vectors (CAVs) [33], which quantifies human-relatable concepts w.r.t
inference via directional derivatives (concept-based)
3. Other methods based on prototyping [14] find proxies to the ground-truth data and counterfacts [43] that generate samples in the neighborhood of the input but belong to a different
class.

While there is significant debate over what constitutes acceptable explanation and interpretation,
recent studies have shown shortcomings in both [58, 72]. The former suffers from reliability [2]
while the latter lacks completeness [72]. A complementary view enables us to leverage the advantages of both to construct bags-of-visual-concepts (BoVCs) representations to address transparency
and trustworthiness in DNNs. The key contributions of this work are listed below.

• Human-friendly concept generation that explains the classification decision of network models
• A completeness score that quantifiably measures the effectiveness of an explanation for a
specific class

5.2

Related Work

Methods related to our work cover the range of intrinsic interpretability where the referenced
model itself is transparent without requiring the need to explain its internal structure [29, 20],
and post-hoc explainability where the goal is to formulate an expressive strategy that generate
insights into a black-box model [33, 21]. The focus of our work is on the latter; we generate
salient interpretations of pre-trained networks without modifying them. The completeness of those
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interpretations is measured relative to the task at hand. We provide a brief review of saliency maps
and concept activation explanations.

5.2.1

Explainability with Saliency Maps

In image networks, a saliency map is a matrix S in the shape I × J such that Si j represents pixel
values Pi j . The visualization of these maps in RGB images is displayed on a diverging scale by
assigning the color blue or red to a specific pixel based on its intensity. Traditionally, blue is
positive, whereas red is negative.
LRP [6] in feed-forward networks uses Taylor series to decompose the nonlinear output towards a
class ŷ then back-propagates the prediction through the layers using distribution rules where Ri is
a per-pixel score. The importance of each neuron at a given layer is proportional to its connection
weights, where the final relevance is obtained at the input layer. There is a drawback when the input
region is large; several variants attempt to rectify it using clustering techniques and regularization
terms. IG [61] uses the notion of a baseline x0 (zero vector) and follows the path integral between
the input x and x0 . The cumulative gradient is computed at the ith dimension for the respective
input and baseline. This approach only assigns positive attributions to x, and selecting x0 is critical
as it may introduce bias. For instance, the feature importance score, which is a factor of xi − xi0
may reduce the saliency of pixels of the input. DEEPLIFT [58] follows the intuition of LRP with
backward propagation and uses a baseline to assign scores. Unlike IG, it follows the slope instead
since the gradient of the input may flatten. GRAD-CAM [57] and GRAD-CAM++ [12] are part of
the same family of CAM methods. To discover essential regions, they exploit the gradient from the
last convolutional layer. The latter differ starkly by computing higher-order derivatives to locate
similar objects in the same image. RISE [49] generates random masks then performs element-wise
multiplication. Heatmaps are derived by linearly combining the masks with the prediction of the
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Figure 5.2: Overview of the VICE method used to generate interpretable concepts using BoVCs.
We illustrate this in a few steps across five distinct classes: 1) image is segmented 2) concepts
extracted and ranked based on network activations 3) keypoint localization performed to dissect
fined-grained representative features of class-concepts 4) features are clustered (centers identified
as +), and per-class visual vocabulary constructed 5) concept completeness measured for statistical
significance to its class.

model.
Broadly, they follow the activations of the model using the gradient or the slope then compute
feature importance. A game-theoretic approach such as Shapley Values [54] to score the features
has become a dominant theme. These methods share a common shortcoming; their explanation
remains local to the behavior of each data point. In this case, each pixel is evaluated based on
its attribution towards prediction. While a single raw pixel may show a positive value when the
input is correctly classified, its neighbors may disagree hence a lack of coherency. Additionally,
the work in [2] reports that across various models, the generated heatmaps can be meaningless.
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5.2.2

Interpretability with Concept Activation Vectors

The new wave of explanations based on CAVs extends beyond feature importance. CAVs are
human-friendly concepts defined manually by a user and are deemed critical to a specific class.
For example, in the ImageNet synset, we select the following labels: hockey stick, fans, and the
hockey player that compositionally defines a hockey game. The idea is to identify the relevance
of each concept in predicting the label puck. Concept-based methods such as TCAV [33] utilize
CAVS to achieve linear interpretability defined by f : Em → Eh , wherein the vector space Em are
neural activations, and Eh a set of unknown concepts. ACE [21] improves on the prior method
by automatically generating concepts. Discovery of unseen concepts is achieved by performing
multi-resolution segmentation of the input, clustering segments, then ranking the features according to their importance. CONCEPTSHAP [72] proposes a method to evaluate the completeness
of concepts. A fundamental assumption of this approach is that concept scores are sufficient to
cover the network’s output. The score is the inner product between the input and the CAV, semantic meaningfulness of a concept relative to the input is determined by a threshold value. The
completeness score over a set of concepts relies on the baseline accuracy of the model. However,
the work in [28] empirically showed that due to poor calibration, accuracy is not a reliable metric
as it shows instability in various settings (e.g. adversarial attacks).
In general, CAV approaches rely on true and random concept samples that are ranked using a
DNN, then inference between actual and incidental concepts is done with a linear classifier that
triages both activations. They offer a significant advantage compared to heatmaps because they
are global, model agnostic explanation methods, and generate human interpretable explanations.
Reliably determining the completeness of concepts remains a significant limitation. We aim to
address this problem in this paper by using a successful adaption of bag-of-words.
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5.3

VICE Method

The algorithm discussed in this section is inspired by bag-of-words (BoW), we provide an extension of this model and image segmentation techniques to extrapolate meaningful features. Comparable to BoW, we develop a vocabulary composed of semantically similar visual concepts, hence
BoVC. We note that a bag of concepts is a set of term vectors that reflects the frequency of features
in the visual corpus. Visual words are clustered according to their color, texture, spatial region, and
overlapping segments. We prune the outliers to create compact feature vectors that yield a significant reduction in the embedding space. Our goal in interpretability of concepts is to quantifiably
measure completeness by efficient patch-wise image dissection. The approach is summarized as a
probabilistic framework for global explanation in DNNs.

5.3.1

Composing Concepts

We define a trained neural network F : Rd 7→ RY with a set of training samples X = x1 , x2 , x3 , ..., xn
as input and the corresponding label for each instance y ∈ Y . We assume the last layer of the model
generates a set of log-probabilities ŷ = arg maxi∈[Y ] that approximates a classification label. Then,
an intermediate layer is a set of feature maps mkl (p, q) 7→ ŷ where p and q respectively are the rows
× columns of the output matrix:

mkl (p, q) = ∑ ∑ xc (i, j) × ekl (u, v)

(5.1)

c i, j

For an arbitrary layer l indexed by the kth convolution, the element-wise multiplication of a block
from the input xc with the predefined kernel ekl yields the transformations Mlk = [mkl (0, 0), mkl (1, 1)
, ..., mkl (max, max)]. Here, mkl is the region of the input space that affects a particular neuron at
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l, and the concatenation of feature motifs constrained by spatial distance creates a hierarchical
portmanteau of sub-segments. Similar to patchwork cells in attention nets [11], subsampled blocks
in a region possess contextual information that enables congruity in extracting a set of concept C.
We leverage the result of previous work [33, 21] to group the projected c ∈ C in the activation space
and rank perceptually similar concepts based on the network sensitivity. Henceforth, we denote
the logit output at the penultimate layer with respect to a label as σl,y and the concept activations
ml :

TC,y,l(x) = ∇σl,y (ml (x)) × vCl

(5.2)

where vCl is the linear activation vector for C, flattened in the shape [height × width × channel] and
TC,y,l(x) is a scalar that captures sensitivity from which the concept score is derived:

SC,y,l(x) =

|{x ∈ Xy : TC,y,l(x) > 0}|
|Xy |

(5.3)

Xy represents samples from a specific class. While SC,k,l(x) approximates a globally interpretable
sensitivity metric, there exists a pitfall. We provide an illustration of this in InceptionV3. Supposed
we flow input [224, 224, 3] through the network and retrieve the activations at l = 132, we obtain
Fl = [12 × 12 × 768] which yields a receptive field of size 351 × 351 where stride and padding
are 16 and 154 respectively. While large receptive fields contain crucial information, they tend to
be more abstract which results in concepts contaminated with spurious information Fig. 5.3(e.g.,
neighboring scenery cuts). As a by-product, the generated explanations suffer from (i) a lack of
statistical precision (ii) completeness.

37

Figure 5.3: Keypoint localization and descriptor assignment between a set of extracted concepts
and the ground truth image. We see that unlike image a and c, concept b is a weak representation
of class warplane. Inferior matches are clipped using Manhattan distance.

5.3.2

Scale-Invariant Concept Features

We propose a scale-invariant feature approximation to reduce noise in concepts and a statistical
framework with per class evidence accumulation to quantify their completeness to address the
problems mentioned above. We build on methods proposed in [39] with Hough transform to iden-
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tify stable features between class-wise concepts cy ∈ Cy and ground truth images xy ∈ Xy for robust
interpretation. We perform keypoint detection by obtaining the convolution of variable-scale Gaussian with an input I(x, y):

G(x, y, σ ) =

1 −(x2 +y2 )/2σ 2
e
∗ I(x, y)
2πσ 2

(5.4)

then compute the Laplacian of Gaussian approximation, difference-of-Gaussian (DoG):

D(x, y, σ ) = G(x, y, kσ ) − G(x, y, σ )

(5.5)

k is a constant factor in scale space, and σ the different scales to generate DOG images. Extremum
of DoGs are detected by comparing individual pixels to their 26 neighbors in 3 × 3 regions which
yield the critical points of interest. From this, we generate keypoint descriptors by obtaining the
gradient magnitude m(x, y) and orientation θ (x, y) of the Gaussian smoothed image G. We define
the following expressions:




gx (x, y) = G(x + 1, y) − G(x − 1, y)

(5.6)



gy (x, y) = G(x, y + 1) − G(x, y + 1)
then compute the m and θ at each pixel:

m(x, y) =

q
gx (x, y)2 + gy (x, y)2

θ (x, y) = tan−1
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gy (x, y)
gx (x, y)

(5.7)

(5.8)

the region around a given keypoint is sampled to form a gradient orientation histogram covering
a 360-degree range over the orientations. The samples are weighed by their gradient magnitude
and summarized to obtain subregions. For instance, an 8 direction histogram with 4 × 4 blocks for
each keypoints yields a vector comprised of 128 features.

k

∑ ||x − µ||2

K = argmin ∑
s

(5.9)

i=1 x∈Si

The dimension reduction render concept feature vectors that are linearly separable with an unsupervised clustering approach such as k-means Eq. (5.9). We construct a histogram where ki ∈ K is
the visual concept index, and this statistical formulation represents the bag-of-visual-concepts for
each class. To compute completeness score, we formulate the foll0wing:

s
||V ||C =

m

n

∑ ∑ |vi j |2

(5.10)

i=1 j=1

−
−r where →
−
−r is the visual
V is produced by →
a −→
a is the representative histogram for a class ŷ and →
vocabulary generated for a sample concept.
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CHAPTER 6: EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION

6.1

Attacks and Defenses

To obtain ground truth data, we adopted the residual block architecture of ResNet-50 [73] to perform classification. We evaluated our hypotheses on 170,000 perturbed images created using notable [13, 53, 13, 61] attacks. We chose two popular defense strategies [53, 61] to evaluate the
effectiveness of these attacks. The experiments were conducted on a 16GB Intel Core(TM) i74790k CPU @ 4.00 GHz machine, equipped with an NVIDIA GeForce RTX 2080. We surveyed
four adversarial attacks, as described in section III, against two countermeasures defined in section
IV.

6.1.1

Dataset

The networks were trained on three datasets: CIFAR10[58], Fashion-MNIST (FMNIST) [26],
and MNIST [71]. MNIST is a popular handwritten digits database comprising 60,000 training
examples and a test set of 10,000 with 10 class labels. FMNIST, which consists of clothing articles,
follows the same distribution as MNIST with 28x28 images and is touted as a drop-in replacement
for the long-time digits dataset. There is an active discussion in the research community about
some of the downsides of MNIST, namely: a) It is too easy to train a convolutional model with
high accuracy b) It hardly meets the requirements of modern computer vision tasks c) As noted in
[5], it gives a false sense of security - where simple adversarial defense methods perform well on
this dataset but come up short on more complex databases. Finally, we used the CIFAR-10 dataset,
which has 60,000 of 32x32 (rgb) images of various objects and 10 distinct classes. We believe that
these three benchmark datasets collectively provide a comprehensive set of features that supports
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our experimental evaluation.
An augmented ResNet-50 architure with 49,723,082 trainable parameters achieved 99% accuracy
of on MNIST, on FMNIST. The hyperparameters were constant across both datasets with a learning rate (lr) of 0.001, batch size of 128, and number of epochs set to 10.

6.1.2

Evaluation Metrics

Table 6.1: Attacks vs accuracy results on MNIST

No Attack
NT-JSMA
FGSM
CWL2
Noise

No Defense
0.994
0.215
0.134
0.135
0.752

Aversarial T.
0.990
0.941
0.912
0.942
0.992

Defense-Gan
0.985
0.974
0.970
0.969
0.955

Table 6.2: Attacks vs accuracy results on FASHION-MNIST

No Attack
NT-JSMA
FGSM
CWL2
Noise

No Defense
0.975
0.062
0.101
0.029
0.328

Aversarial T.
0.956
0.948
0.913
0.937
0.946

Defense-Gan
0.924
0.893
0.879
0.889
0.897

In table I, we note that on average adversarial training (AT) showed lower performance when
faced with adversarial perturbation. The most notable difference is the FGSM attack which caused
a 9% drop in prediction accuracy.
Another observation, is the inconsistency of the noise attack. The brute-force random sampling
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Table 6.3: Attacks vs accuracy results on CIFAR10

No Attack
NT-JSMA
FGSM
CWL2
Noise

No Defense
0.980
0.074
0.120
0.085
0.370

Aversarial T.
0.973
0.941
0.915
0.969
0.920

Defense-Gan
0.942
0.893
0.872
0.844
0.858

Table 6.4: Explainability-based Defense
Dataset
MNIST

F-MNIST

CIFAR10

Attack

No Defense

Gradient Training

Adversarial Training

NONE

0.993

0.991

0.995

FGSM

0.036

0.969

0.928

NONE

0.989

0.990

0.985

FGSM

0.093

0.975

0.937

NONE

0.994

0.992

0.994

FGSM

0.102

0.989

0.912

to unmask the gradient of the trained model had a varying degree of success. When comparing
its effectiveness on the handwritten-digits and the fashion dataset, its success rate varies quite
drastically. We suggest that the random seeding of the number generator played a significant role
in the variadic results. It proves to be practically ineffective against AT on MNIST with e = 0.002.
We investigate the actual attack applied to the image with which the adversary managed to fool our
classifier. In Section 6.1.2, we visualize the deepest convolutions of the network which shows the
input supplemented with a perturbation δ for each attack.
Our hypothesis follows that the byproduct of gradient masking employed by adversarial training
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Figure 6.1: Visualization of perturbed convolutional filters at the deepest layer of the network(Dress) by FGSM, CWL2, NOISE and NT-JSMA.

with the fast gradient sign method yields non-smoothness of the classifier, as such the perturbed
examples drawn from the test set yielded a higher prediction error rate. By contrast, defensegan’s approach does not directly alter the classifier’s performance. The generative network act
as a decontamination layer that transforms perturbed input into benign ones before reaching the
classifier. Theoretically, there exists a reconstruction loss optimized by Eq. (3.3); the difference
between x and z∗ is negligible, as noted in our experiments. We show these results for No Attack
in Table 6.1 Table 6.2 Table 6.3 where the Defense-Gan model accuracy was on average 0.013%
less than the base model accuracy.
Furthermore, we evaluate the accuracy of the baseline model across 10 samples binned by prediction accuracy. For varying degree of attack perturbations (e), our observation in the calibrated and
uncalibrated case shows that the former is significantly more resilient against attacks than the latter
(Section 6.1.2).
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Table 6.5: DNN Calibration Metrics
Configuration

ECE

NLL

Uncalibrated

0.230

2.274

Calibrated

0.112

1.607

Figure 6.2: Model robustness in calibrated vs uncalibrated scenarios.

This is consistent with the empirical estimation of the confidence in a non-adversarial setting.
While it is practically infeasible to achieve perfect calibration P(Ŷ = Y | P̂ = p) = p, ∀p ∈ [0, 1],
we observed that our baseline ResNet-50 model is well-calibrated for the classification task on
CIFAR-10 for τ = 1.75.
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Figure 6.3: Uncalibrated versus calibrated confidence of ResNet-50 on CIFAR-10. The area under
the expected line is identified as the gap between achieved and perfect calibration.

This is shown in Section 6.1.2 as the confidence of the model (F0/ ) closely follow the the expected
line. We support this finding with two standard measures ECE and NLL in Table 6.5.

6.2

6.2.1

GAAD

Evaluation Setup

Our findings are reported on three datasets CIFAR10, Fashion-MNIST, and MNIST dataset. We
start by sharing the top levels of the detector in Table 6.6.
The simplicity of our network makes it a suitable candidate for an additive layer to existing models.
We evaluated our classifier in two primary configurations: standalone (A) and combined with
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Table 6.6: Top 3 layers of detector network with 551,713 parameters
Layer

Params

Conv2D

filters = 64, kernel size = 5x5,

strides = 2x3
LeakyReLU

alpha = 0.1

Dropout

rate = 0.3

...

...

Dense

units = 1, activation = sigmoid

Table 6.7: Combined detector with InceptionV3
Layer

Input

Output

Params

conv

75x75x3

37x37x32

864

...

...

...

...

conv69

3x3x192

3x3x192

147,456

mixed7

3x3x192

3x3x768

0

Combined

3x3x768

1

0

InceptionV3 minus the bottom layers (B) shown in Table 6.7 - intermediate layers shown as (...).
One of the primary advantages of this approach is that in either configuration, the baseline accuracy
of the targeted network is unaffected.

47

6.2.2

Attack Configuration

Our evaluation is conducted in a white-box setting where the parameters of the model are known
to the attacker. We choose the benchmark attacks below to create adversarial samples:

1. Carlini & Wagner L2 (CWL2): minimize P(x, x + δ ) + c ∗ f (x + δ )s.t. x + δ ∈ [0, 1]n where
P is the distance from the input and attack sample and δ = 100 which produces lower distortion.
2. Jacobian-based Saliency Map (JSMA): which attacks the input space using saliency map,
we bounded the perturbation factor with `2 = 0.3.
3. Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM):
x + εsign(∇x J(θ , x, y)) where ε = 0.0015.

6.2.3

Train & Test Dataset

We provide complementary details on the generated data for adversarial testing, and the submanifold sampling ST .
The adversarial (fake) data generation approach shown in Table 6.8 is based on the attack configurations provided in the prior section. In the data pre-processing stage, we applied random rotation
and crops to the image for greater generalization. Our held-out validation set made up 20% of
the data.The nearest neighbor approach to generate the training set S was evaluated with different
parameters for k. Unlike other parametric methods, choosing the optimum value k = 3 is not a
constant factor but rather dependent on the complexity of the data (e.g. images with scenery features). For instance, on MNIST k = 1 generated well separated clusters whereas on CIFAR-10,
values 2 ≤ k ≤ 3 were sufficient.
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Table 6.8: Data configuration
Name

Size

Description

adv-*

variable

individual attack, size is based on dataset

batch-mnist

60K

attack 1,2,3 samples

batch-fmnist

60k

attack 1,2,3 samples

batch-cifar10

50k

attack 1,2,3 samples

batch-mixed

60k

cifar10: 30k real & 30k fake (attack 1,2,3)

6.2.4

Network Attribution Confidence Evaluation

In Section 6.2.4 we evaluate the robustness of the model and our NAC metric.

Figure 6.4: Evaluation of network accuracy with respect to confidence with NAC.

An interesting observation, is shown where the output of the softmax layer σ (·) of the network
gave a false pretense of robustness. However, the NAC score establishes a baseline to gauge
the model’s true inference strength. This is further demonstrated in the monotonic increase of
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confidence towards 100%. This observation confirmed the following hypothesis, as the network
learns latent features in the ST domain, it improves on its categorical distinction. We note that for
practical applications, methods such as temperature scaling [28] - a post-hoc approach has proven
to offer significant advantage in calibrating neural networks accuracy.

6.2.5

Detecting Attacks

We evaluate the performance of the GAAD method on a batch-mixed sample as shown in Fig. 6.5.

Figure 6.5: Independent evaluation of attack detection of the base DNN without and with GAAD.

Without our GAAD framework in configuration A, the results showed a stark difference between
false negatives and true positives.
It follows the intuition that the baseline model cannot effectively distinguish between real and fake
examples, despite achieving 99.73% accuracy on benign examples. However, the subsampling of
meta-features with GAAD considerably reduced the distribution input space compared to a bare
network. We corroborate this notion in Fig. 6.6, where the decision boundary of a baseline model
and our detector is depicted.
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Figure 6.6: On the left, we show the decision boundary of a shallow CNN on batch-mixed. On the
right is our detector in configuration B which shows a non-linear separation between attacked and
non-perturbed examples.

Furthermore, our network achieved high F1 scores shown in Table 6.9. These metrics indicate
that the meta-features extracted held significance influence on the classifier. Moreover, GAAD
generalizes well when faced with attacks that were not in the training sample.
However, a noticeable trend in the results show that JSMA had the lowest score in each dataset.
We trained our detector with constant hyperparameters across all dataset, we hypothesize that with
grid search for parameter tuning higher detection is achievable. Additionally, we report that this
saliency map attack took several hours to generate in particular due to the satisfiability constraint
to limit added noise.

51

Table 6.9: F1 score of adversarial attack detection with GAAD on 3 adversarial datasets and 3
attacks.
Dataset

adv-MNIST

adv-FMNIST

adv-CIFAR10

6.2.6

Attack Type

F1 Score

CLW

0.829

FGSM

0.976

JSMA

0.895

CLW

0.977

FGSM

0.989

JSMA

0.780

CLW

0.870

FGSM

0.973

JSMA

0.771

Comparison with other Methods

We evaluate our GAAD approach against state-of-the-art detectors. Detector selection was based
on two criteria: 1) The detector can be evaluate independently from a baseline model 2) The
effectiveness of the detector is not a factor of the model architecture.
To that end, we report the AUC-ROC score on three detectors: LID [40], NFP [17], and ImageT
[65] in Table 6.10. GAAD outperforms all other methods on the batch-mixed sample. The three
compared networks were configured according to parameters provided in their respective papers.
We also consider the transferability of the GAAD approach to a broader class of image classifiers.
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Table 6.10: AUC-ROC score on batch samples
Data

ImageT [65] LID [40] NFP [17] GAAD (ours)

batch-mnist

85.50

91.49

99.36

99.90

batch-fmnist

84.12

89.73

98.86

98.97

batch-cifar10

80.65

87.63

97.19

99.78

batch-mixed

78.43

84.28

96.27

98.31

Table 6.11: Inference Cost Comparison
Time ImageT [65] LID [40] NFP [17] GAAD (ours)
ms (±)

1895

120

88

90

With sufficient training examples, the training distribution /mathcalS could enable a representative
cross-dataset meta-feature set such that a pre-trained GAAD is just as effective in various image
applications.
Additionally, we report the inference time of the detectors compared to GAAD in configuration B.
These metrics were captured on an NVIDIA GeForce RTX 2080 graphics card. To standardize our
testing, all tensors were executed on the GPU. As shown in Table 6.11, GAAD adds comparable
inference time relative to other methods.
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Figure 6.7: Concept visual words from quantized vectors across 12 ImageNet classes.

6.3

VICE

We empirically evaluate this approach by collecting the performance of VICE’s interpretation on
the ImageNet [55] benchmark dataset and two state-of-the-art models: InceptionV3 [64], VGG-16
[60]. As reported in [21] for automatic concept generation, we show 10 random classes out of
1000, and their respective visual vocabulary Fig. 6.7 computed over 15, 000 images.

6.3.1

Evaluating Concept Quality

As depicted in the second row of Fig. 5.2, we start by segmenting each image, an adaption of [1] to
retrieve superpixels, and ran the samples through several bottleneck layers of the network to obtain
concept activations. The activations are pruned based on euclidean distance, and the remaining
ones correspond to concepts that generate strong activations from the model.
We calculate the activation mean for each distinct class and note a significant disparity between
VGG and Inception. We report these results in Fig. 6.8. The authors of [33] suggest to select the
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Figure 6.8: Activation mean of bottleneck layers across 12 random classes in VGG-16 and InceptionV3.

appropriate layer, one must evaluate the trade-off between color, texture, or object for similarity
extraction. However, this approach is sub-optimal and requires expert knowledge of the model
architecture. We address this problem by sampling across features to develop BoVCs that are
agnostic of the layer and do not require this trade-off.
Furthermore, as reported in Section 5.3.1, the obtained concepts, despite producing substantial
activations through the layers, can be misleading. We demonstrate an instance of this phenomenon
in Fig. 6.10 where an input image containing two primary subjects: human and dog, is assigned the
Bedlington Terrier label with 90% accuracy by InceptionV3. However, the top generated concepts
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Figure 6.9: Evaluation of VICE on unseen concepts

do not yield a meaningful interpretation for the class. We hypothesize that network activation
alone is not a reliable mean to select concepts in images composed of multiple classes and scenery
segments. In the second row, we show the effectiveness of our CCS metric that yields the most
coherent concept based on perceptual similarity to the prediction.

6.3.2

Concept Completeness Metric

Here, we evaluate the importance of concepts selected by VICE. We generate 27, 665 concepts for
the 12 classes mentioned previously and randomly choose the most significant concept for each
category. We ran this experiment over 100 batches and show the results in Fig. 6.11. The plot
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Figure 6.10: Misleading concepts in image with multiple subjects.

suggests that VICE’s recommendation rank in the 75th percentile.
To verify the suitability of the generated interpretation, we visualize the concepts under two conditions to answer the following questions:

1. How does the removal of a concept from the input affect inference?
2. How significant is the extrapolated concept with respect to what the network sees?

We show the qualitative and quantitative significance in Fig. 6.9. We fed the unperturbed input to
the VGG-16 model and obtained the top-3 predictions (column 1 & 2). Subsequently, we repeat
this step for the ground truth image minus the concept (column 3 & 4), and the interpretation by
VICE minus the input (column 5 & 6). It shows on a limited sample, the bag-of-visual-concept
approach captures the complexity of images to provide a representative vocabulary for each class.
We present this distinction in the first row, where the concept for type schooner as ranked by the
CCS metric rendered comparable accuracy as the ground truth image.
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Figure 6.11: Concept visual words from quantized vectors across 12 ImageNet classes.

Another observation can be seen in the second row. Highlighted in red are the prediction differences when compared to the top-3 classification with the original input. Intuitively, for images
that share common textual similarities, the model’s prediction varies. In this case, a concept extracted from a lionfish has significant overlapping features with a jaguar, but the ground truth’s
additional features allow the network to discriminate between the two classes. Similarly, in row
three, a pickup was labeled limousine because of salient features standard in cars (e.g., the frame
and tires).
Furthermore, these images are from a held-out validation set that was excluded from the training.
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Figure 6.12: Concept visual words from quantized vectors across 12 ImageNet classes.

It shows the robustness of VICE interpretation on unseen data. Finally, we corroborate these
results in Fig. 6.12 (on both models) by demonstrating the monotonically increasing accuracy in
predicting the concepts relative to our completeness score.
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION

We hope that the findings in this paper will spark some thoughts in new research areas that enable
novel defense strategies and more robust models. As a matter of practicality, we have shown the
trade-off of choosing fast defense methods such as adversarial training that does not affect the
model complexity but is less effective against attacks than generative adversarial networks that add
another layer on top of an existing model but shows higher hardness against perturbations. We
visualize the perturbation of each attack and their effectiveness. Additionally, we achieve stateof-the-art accuracy on three benchmark datasets to empirically motivate our findings. Lastly, we
propose a new defense method based on works in the field of neural interpretability.
The vulnerability of deep learning models has stalled their adoption for critical applications, and in
high assurance environments. We study the notion of feature importance in deep neural networks
and how they influence classification algorithms. In this paper, we set out to better understand
from a causal perspective the effect of adversarial perturbations against existing architectures. To
this end, we provide a mean to quantifiably measure network confidence as it’s been shown the
accuracy at the softmax layer is unreliable. Additionally, we propose a new detector (GAAD) based
on gradient approximation and deep feature extraction that reliably detects adversarial attacks. In
our experimental results, we show the effectiveness of our confidence computation metric on the
MNIST, Fashion-MNIST and CIFAR-10 datasets. Our evaluation of GAAD using F1 and AUCROC standard benchmarks show that our method achieved high scores against several attacks.
Finally, we show the effectiveness of VICE, a strategy for explaining and interpreting neural network decisions. Our experimental evaluation shows that our method exceeds current post-hoc
approaches in XAI, especially when the input is cluttered. The extracted key points around the
input enable us to generate meaningful and sufficient explanations for a machine learning model
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with high qualitative and quantitative scores.
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